We analyze the determinants of participation (whether to study) and schooling (where and what to study) in a public system of higher education, based on a unique dataset of all eligible high school pupils in an essentially closed region (Flanders). We …nd that pupils perceive the available institutions and programs as close substitutes, implying an ambiguous role for travel costs: they hardly a¤ect the participation decisions, but have a strong impact on the schooling decisions. In addition, high school background plays an important role in both the participation and schooling decisions. To illustrate how our empirical results can inform the debate on reforming public systems, we assess the e¤ects of tuition fee increases. Uniform cost-based tuition fee increases achieve most of the welfare gains; the additional gains from fee di¤erenti-ation are relatively unimportant. These welfare gains are quite large if one makes conservative assumptions on the social cost of public funds, and there is a substantial redistribution from students to outsiders.
Introduction
Public systems of higher education are experiencing increased challenges in many European countries. The demand for higher education has more than doubled over the past thirty years. Public spending increased at the same rate, because governments maintained a policy of very low tuition fees and high subsidies per student. At the same time, there is little evidence that the public systems performed signi…cantly better than the more market oriented systems in the Anglo-Saxon countries. If anything, the gap appears to be widening. According to the E.P.I. (Usher et al. (2005) ), the countries with low private contributions are also often the countries with low student participation rates, and vice versa. 1 In terms of research performance, most top universities come from the Anglo-Saxon countries. Jacobs and van der Ploeg (2005) compare the relative performance of both systems in more detail. There is an increasing awareness that the public systems should incorporate more market-oriented principles, whether through centralized regulatory or more drastic decentralized reforms. The U.K. is a notable example of this evolution: tuition fees have recently increased rather drastically, accompanied with the introduction of income-contingent student loans in line with reform proposals by Barr (2004) and others. Against this background we analyze the participation and schooling decisions in a public system of higher education. The participation decision is the decision whether to start with a higher education. The schooling decision is the decision where to study (which college or university) and what to study (which program). We consider the role of the pupils' travel costs, their high school background and demographics, based on a unique data set of all eligible high school pupils in the entire and essentially closed region of Flanders.
2 A key feature of our data set is the information on the pupils' locations, from which it is possible to compute the travel costs to all educational study options. Another key feature is the information on the educational choices at the highly disaggregate level of the study program. One of our central …ndings is that pupils perceive the higher education institutions and programs as close substitutes. This implies an ambiguous role for travel costs: college proximity hardly in ‡uences the pupils'participation decisions, but it has a strong impact on their schooling decisions. Put di¤erently, pupils are highly cost elastic for the decision where and what to study, but not for the decision whether to study. In addition, we …nd that the high school background plays an important role in both the participation and schooling decisions.
1 The E.P.I. points out two exceptions, Finland and the Netherlands, where private contributions are among the lowest and overall participation in higher education among the highest.
2 Flanders is the Northern part of Belgium, where Dutch is spoken. While access is open, in practice the undergraduate system has been quite closed from the French-speaking part and from other countries.
For example, pupils with a general high school background have an additional willingness to pay (in terms of travel costs) for a university than a college education of more than e 4000, compared with pupils of technical or professional high school backgrounds. We use our empirical results to draw implications for reforming public systems of higher education. Many issues have occupied the current debate, including the e¤ects of raising tuition fees, rationalizing supply, and moving from input-based to output-based subsidies. We focus on the e¤ects of raising tuition fees, which have been uniform at very low levels in most European countries, including Flanders. 3 Our estimated cost elasticities imply that a uniform fee increase only has a small impact on overall participation, though comparatively more on pupils from the technical and professional high school backgrounds. Di¤erentiated fee increases also have a low overall e¤ect on participation but they imply large substitution e¤ects (colleges versus universities; di¤erent study …elds).
Our estimated welfare e¤ects of tuition fee reform can be summarized as follows.
(1) Uniform cost-based tuition fee increases achieve most of the attainable total welfare gains. The additional gains from fee di¤erentiation by program type or program …eld (as opposed to uniform fee increases) are relatively unimportant. (2) The welfare gains are quite large if one makes conservative assumptions on the social cost of public funds. (3) If one ignores the social cost of public funds, the welfare gains from fee increases are small, but there is still a substantial redistribution from students to outsiders. The overall conclusion is that uniform fee increases achieve most of the total welfare gains, as well as a fairer distribution between students and outsiders (if properly accompanied with student loans).
Previous empirical research has focused on the e¤ects of tuition fees on overall participation in higher education. These studies typically focus on the U.S. where it is possible to exploit variation in tuition fees at the state level. Estimates on the participation e¤ects of an increase in fees by $ 1,000 are in the range of 3-8%; see Kane (1995) , Dynarski (2003) and Cameron and Heckman (2001) . We …nd a considerably lower participation e¤ect of about 1%, which is perhaps not surprising since the current level of fees is low in the public system we consider.
Only a few number of studies have looked at the e¤ects of tuition fees at the level of the institution, though not at the more detailed level of the program …eld. Most closely related to our work is Long (2004) , who conducted a comprehensive study on the role of tuition fees and travel costs at the level the institution. 4 She …rst estimates a conditional logit model for the schooling decision (where to study) and subsequently a binary logit model for the participation decision. She …nds that tuition fees have a higher impact on the schooling than on the participation decision. We extend Long's model in several respects. First, we consider the participation and schooling decisions in an integrated nested logit framework. This approach allows us to infer the impact of tuition fees on both participation and schooling from variation in travel costs among pupils (in the absence of tuition fee variation in a public system). 5 Second, we consider the schooling decision at the even more disaggregate level of both the institution and the program …eld. Finally, we conduct a total welfare analysis on the e¤ects of uniform and di¤erentiated tuition fee increases, an issue that is perhaps of stronger relevance in the European public systems than in the more market-oriented U.S. system. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss some key features of the higher education system in Flanders in 2001. This is representative for several other public systems of higher education, and it introduces our subsequent questions. In section 3 we introduce the empirical model of educational choice, and our estimation approach to handle the very large data set. The fourth section discusses the empirical results. We compare the estimates from our disaggregate nested logit model (at the level of the institution and study program) with those of aggregate logit and nested logit models. We also compute the estimated cost elasticities at various levels (total market level, colleges versus universities, and the four main program …elds). Finally, we estimate the welfare e¤ects of uniform and di¤erentiated fee increases. Section 5 concludes.
The market for higher education in Flanders
We begin with a description of the relevant supply and demand characteristics of this market, which is representative for many other public systems of higher education. Our description applies to the year of our data set, [2001] [2002] . Rouse (1995) or Frenette (2003) . However, with the exception of Long (2004) these studies are not at the level of the institution, so that distance is usually proxied by the distance to the most nearby college, regardless of whether that college is chosen. 5 We are able to compute the distance and travel costs of each pupil to each alternative based on information of the pupils'home address postal code, whereas Long (2004) only observes the pupils'high school address postal code.
Supply of higher education
Institutions and programs There are two types of higher education institutions in Flanders: colleges and universities. The colleges focus exclusively on teaching and o¤er vocational study programs, which are oriented to professional training. Universities are also active in research, and they o¤er academic study programs. Both colleges and universities either have a catholic or a noncatholic orientation. They sometimes have multiple campuses, especially the colleges.
The vocational programs o¤ered at the colleges are either short programs (one cycle of 3 years), or long programs (two cycles comprising a total of 4 or 5 years). The academic programs at universities are always long programs (two cycles). 6 The programs can be divided into four …elds: arts, social sciences, biomedical sciences, and exact sciences. Each …eld consists of several elemental study options, e.g. nursing (a vocational program in biomedical sciences) or civil engineering (an academic program in exact sciences). Table 1 provides an overview of the supply of higher education in the year [2001] [2002] . The top panel shows the number of campuses, broken down by type of institution and program …eld. The total number of campuses is 53, the majority being college campuses (44 versus 9 university campuses). Colleges more often have a catholic a¢ liation, whereas universities more often have a non-catholic a¢ liation. Colleges show a higher degree of specialization, since they typically do not o¤er all program …elds. For example, only 12 out of the 44 college campuses o¤er arts. Universities tend to be less specialized. All non-catholic universities o¤er programs in biomedical and exact sciences, and all catholic universities o¤er programs in arts and social sciences.
The bottom panel of Table 1 shows the corresponding student numbers. The number of students is higher at colleges than at universities (25,182 versus 12,299) . But the number of college campuses is comparatively even higher, so that the average scale at college campuses is generally lower than at university campuses. It is also evident that most students choose programs in social sciences, especially at the colleges, followed by programs in the exact sciences.
To give an idea of the geographic coverage of higher education supply across the region 6 In recent years, the long vocational programs at colleges have shown a trend towards convergence to their academic counterparts at the universities (e.g. the economics or the engineering programs). This development has in part been stimulated by the government. Already in 1991, a Decree stipulated the same rules for two-cycle vocational programs at colleges as for academic programs at universities. Colleges o¤ering two-cycle programs also became entitled to do applied research by means of co-operation agreements with universities. More recently, the Bologna Declaration leading to the Bachelor-Master reforms has strengthened these developments.
of Flanders, Figure 1 shows the locations of the campuses on a map. The upper map refers to the universities, the lower one to the colleges. Focus only on the circle areas for now. Each circle refers to a di¤erent campus, and is proportional to the number of …rst-year students. The …gure shows that there is broad geographic coverage of higher education, with the exception of the "corners"in the West and in the East. However, this broad coverage is entirely due to the colleges. University coverage is concentrated around two main university cities (Ghent and Leuven).
The role of the government As in most other European countries the undergraduate system of higher education in Flanders is entirely public. We only provide a very stylized overview here. Van He¤en and Lub's (2003) country report provides a more detailed description. 7 Both universities and colleges receive subsidies for teaching; universities in addition receive subsidies for research. The subsidies for teaching consist of a …xed and a variable component. The variable subsidies di¤er across the various study programs to account for di¤erences in the variable cost per student. According to CHEPS (Deen et al. (2005) ), the cost per student tends to be lower for classroom-based programs (arts and social sciences) than for laboratory-based programs (biomedical and exact sciences). To account for this, the Flemish government has traditionally maintained a relatively simple system of four subsidy categories at colleges and three categories at universities. It has recently proposed to revise the rates to distinguish between additional categories, in line with the practices in seven benchmark countries.
8 Table 2 shows the (student-weighted) average variable subsidies per student, for the four program …elds at colleges and universities. The …rst panel shows the averages using the current subsidy rates, the second using the proposed revised rates. The table shows that the subsidies, and hence the estimated variable costs per student, are lower in arts and social sciences than in biomedical sciences and exact sciences. They also tend to be lower at colleges than at universities. The proposed revised rates show a larger variation, especially across the di¤erent program …elds. 7 For shorter descriptions covering a large set of countries including the region of Flanders, we refer to Maassen (2000) or Eurydice (2000) . 8 These revisions …t in a larger policy reform proposal in 2005, which aims to transform the input-based subsidy system (based on the number of incoming students) to an output-based system (based on the number of outcoming students). To prepare these reforms, the input-based subsidies were frozen in 2000 and should become output-based in 2007. This development is not relevant for our purposes here; we are mainly interested in describing the variable subsidies as our proxy for how the goverment perceives the cost per student. For a detailed description of the current (frozen) subsidy rates, see van He¤en and Lub (2003) , and of the proposed revised rates, see Vandenbroucke (2005) .
The variable subsidies are only part of the government's "…rst ‡ow" budget on higher education.
9 According to Cantillon et al. (2005) , the total budget is about e 8600 per student, so that the variable part only accounts for about 38 percent of public spending. The remaining part is independent of the number of students and can be viewed as a measure of the …xed costs to be covered. In addition to the subsidies, the government intervenes in the tuition fees that the colleges and universities are allowed to set. While the government gives some discretion, the tuition fees show hardly any variation in practice. During the year of our study, 2001, the tuition fees were essentially uniform at e 425 for colleges and e 445 for universities. This shows that private contributions are extremely low, only about 5% of public higher education spending (excluding research).
The policy of high subsidies and low tuition fees may have adverse e¤ects on both the diversity and the quality of the supply. First, colleges and universities may have incentives to o¤er too much diversity. The government therefore regulates the supply of programs. There is an o¢ cial list of subsidizable programs, but not all institutions necessarily receive the authorization to o¤er all programs. The result is a specialization, which we illustrated earlier in Table 1 . Second, the institutions may have limited incentives to provide su¢ cient quality. A system of quality assurance aims to provide su¢ cient incentives, through selfassessment and external visiting committees. In principle, the government can take away the authorization to o¤er a study program if quality is insu¢ cient, though this rarely happens in practice.
Demand for higher education -summary statistics
We now discuss the demand for higher education. This also introduces our data set and subsequent econometric analysis of educational choice.
Every pupil with a high school degree is eligible to start with higher education. This is true regardless of the type of high school degree that has been obtained. There are three main types of high school degrees. A general high school degree provides a broad theoretical training as a basis to continue with higher education. A technical high school degree puts more emphasis on specialized technical-theoretic training but at the same time aims to provide a su¢ ciently general background to prepare for higher education. A professional high school degree focuses mostly on practical training. Pupils with a professional high school degree can still start with higher education provided that they have taken additional 9 The …rst ‡ow budget is the part of the budget that directly goes to teaching. The second ‡ow and third ‡ow budget are devoted to research.
courses during a seventh year of study. 10 In contrast with many other countries, there is no direct rationing of participation in higher education, whether through numerus clausus or through minimum course requirements or grades obtained during high school. 11 Each pupil who …nishes high school is therefore in the position to make both the participation decision (whether to study) and the schooling decision (where and what to study) by selecting one option out of the full set of all available study alternatives.
To analyze this educational choice process, we combined two basic data sets, covering essentially the entire population of eligible pupils: a "pupils data set"of all 55,905 last year high school pupils in the year 2001; and a "students data set" of the 37,481 participating students.
12 For each pupil we observe sex, nationality, age, the high school institution, the high school degree (program), and the home address. The Appendix provides more detailed information on the two basic data sets, as well as on some additional auxiliary data sets, and how we combined them.
We constructed a number of relevant variables describing the pupils'pro…le, and we organize them in three groups. The …rst group consists of general demographics: sex, nationality and the religious a¢ liation of the high school. The second group contains the scholastic ability variables: years of repetition, the type of high school and the study program followed at high school. Years of repetition is the age minus 18, and measures the number of failures during high school. The type of high school (general, technical or professional) measures the intellectual background, as we discussed above. The study programs at high school offer additional information on ability and intellectual interests. For general high school, we distinguish among the following …elds: classical languages, modern languages, economics, sciences and mathematics. These can be combined so they are not mutually exclusive. The brightest pupils often follow either classical languages or mathematics (or both). In technical high schools, there is a very large number of programs. For simplicity, we only distinguish between programs that are "people oriented"(e.g. beautician, interior design) and programs that are "product oriented" (e.g. car mechanics, construction techniques). There is also 10 There is also a fourth high school category, arts. This also o¤ers a quite practical training. We do not exclude them from our analysis, but since there are relatively few pupils here we include them in our base category.
11 During the year of our study, some programs (e.g. engineering and medicine) indirectly limited the number of students through an entry examination. This does not function however as a mechanism to directly limit the number of students per year. 12 These are the pupils who either enroll immediately after highschool in 2001 (36,111 students) or with one period of delay (1,370 students). Hence, the total participation rate of eligible pupils is 67%. Note that the actual participation rate in higher education is lower since only 79% obtain of the people obtain a high school degree.
a large number of programs in professional high schools, but since there are relatively few pupils graduating from professional schools (and even fewer that start with higher education) we do not distinguish explicitly between programs for this category. The third group of variables refers to transportation costs: distance travelled to the campus (in km), and time travelled either by road or by train (in min). Time travelled by road is the fastest calculated route from the pupil's home postal code to her chosen campus postal code. Time by train is equal to the travel time by road to the nearest well-connected train station, plus the travel time on the train, plus a …xed 10 minutes to incorporate the time to get from the destination station to the campus. Based on these variables, we also constructed an annual commuting cost variable in monetary terms, for a student making 300 trips per year at a cost of e 0.25 per km and an opportunity cost of time of e 8 per hour 13 .
This variable will enter our empirical model and it is further motivated at that point. Table 3 shows the summary statistics: means for all the dummy variables (interpreted as fractions of the population), and means and standard deviations (in brackets) for the continuous variables. The …rst column shows the unconditional statistics, i.e. for all pupils. The remaining columns show the statistics conditional on the chosen alternative.
Demographics Slightly fewer males than females graduated from a high school in 2001 (48%), and they are comparatively less likely to participate in higher education (45%). More surprisingly, male pupils are less represented in catholic institutions. This may be due to preferences, or to the di¤erent supply o¤ered at catholic institutions; our subsequent empiral model distinguishes between these possibilities by accounting for the combined choice of institution and program …elds. Similarly, pupils with a foreign nationality are less likely to participate (2% of the pupils is foreign, but only 1% of the students), and those who do participate are less represented at catholic institutions.
The majority of the pupils (75%) attended a catholic high school, and they are more likely to participate (78% of the students). Furthermore, students from a catholic high school are much more likely to choose a catholic institution (87% of the students at catholic institutions have a catholic high school background, compared to 75% in general). This suggests there are still strong links between the catholic high schools and the higher education institutions. 13 The kilometre cost is a commonly used measure of distance cost for tax purposes (Belgisch Staatsblad (2006) ). The opportunity cost of time is representative for the hourly wage of student jobs (Jobdienst KU Leuven (2006)).
Ability The average years of repetitions is 0.6 (with a large standard deviation of 1.06), but it is much lower for participating students (0.36) than for outsiders (1.11).
14 Among the students, the average years of repetition is especially small for students going to universities rather than colleges (0.16 versus 0.48). Up to 48% of the pupils come from a general high school, slightly more than one third from a technical high school, and only 17% from a professional high school. 15 Pupils from a general high school are more likely to participate (they make up 60% of the students, and only 48% of the pupils). Pupils with a technical high school background are more or less proportionally represented in higher education, but they mainly participate at colleges, and only form a small minority at universities. Pupils from a professional high school (the base) are least represented. Pupils with a general high school background in mathematics or classical languages have a particularly strong propensity to go to universities rather than to colleges or staying out. Pupils from a "people oriented"technical high school have a strong presence at colleges (over one third).
Mobility Distance travelled is on average 35 kilometers, with a large standard deviation. Car and train travel time are on average 31 minutes and 48 minutes. The average annual commuting costs (including transportation and time costs) is e 3,800. The average travel distance is higher for students going to universities than for students going to colleges (42 versus 31 km), re ‡ecting the lower geographic coverage of universities as shown earlier on the map in …gure 1. The rather high standard deviations show there is a lot of variation in distance travelled across students.
Our earlier Figure 1 provides additional information on the role of proximity to institutions in explaining participation. The di¤erent shadings shows the di¤erent participation rates throughout the region. Part (a) suggests that the university participation rates are related to proximity: high participation rates (above 25%) are especially found around the two main universities, whereas low participation rates (below 15%) occur in the West and East corners of the region. Part (b) also suggests that the college participation rates vary across the region according to college proximity. Nevertheless, the pattern is less pronounced, probably due to the high geographic coverage throughout the region. Note that the areas with little university participation are often areas with a high college participation (see for 14 As mentioned earlier, for the pupils of a professional highschool, there is one additional preparatory year before becoming eligible to higher education. We include this in our de…nition of repetitions. 15 The total fraction of pupils in a professional highschools is much larger than 17%. However, a substantial number does not complete their degree, and we are looking here at last year pupils only.
example the low university and the high college participation in the West). This suggests that proximity may not matter that much for the decision whether to study as for the decision where to study. Whether this is indeed the case, will be addressed in our econometric model. These summary statistics provide some preliminary suggestive …ndings on the role of demographics, ability and mobility in participation and schooling decisions. We are now ready to discuss how our econometric framework takes these characteristics into account.
Empirical framework
We now specify the empirical model of the pupils'participation and schooling decisions, i.e. their decisions whether to start with higher education studies, and, if so, where and what to study. We model their decision in a discrete choice framework in which individuals choose the alternative that maximizes random utility among the set of available alternatives. We adopt a version of the nested logit model (McFadden (1978) ). This model is well suited to deal in a reasonably ‡exible way with the very large size of our data set: 55; 905 pupils, 563 choice alternatives, and a large set of observed variables describing pupils and choice alternatives. In particular, the model allows for consistent estimation with a large set of choice alternatives, by explicitly aggregating and/or sampling over the alternatives. At the same time, the model incorporates unobserved heterogeneity since individuals may have correlated preferences across alternatives belonging to the same nest. More general models of unobserved heterogeneity, such as mixed or random coe¢ cient logit models (McFadden and Train (2000) ) inhibit sampling over alternatives and are therefore not feasible given the size of our choice set. Since we capture a lot of observed individual characteristics anyway, the need for more general models of unobserved heterogeneity is less than in other applications.
The choice model
Each individual i chooses one out of a large set of choice alternatives. The individuals are the pupils who have …nished high school and who are therefore eligible to start with higher education studies. The choice alternatives are de…ned by the institution (the university or college) and the actual program (e.g. nursing, civil engineering, etc.) There is also one nostudy alternative. The total number of choice alternatives is very large (563, including the no-study alternative), and it is typically not feasible to systematically incorporate observable choice-speci…c variables at this level of detail. Our framework therefore explicitly deals with the possibility of aggregation and sampling over alternatives.
There are J study options, j = 1 J. For each study option j there are K j variants or "elemental alternatives", k = 1 K j . Alternative 0 is the no-study option. The total number of alternatives is P J j=1 K j + 1 = 563. The empirical analysis aggregates the K j variants to the level of the study option j. For example, the study option may be de…ned at the level of the institution, or at the level of the institution, program type (short vocational, long vocational or academic) and program …eld (arts, social sciences, biomedical sciences or exact sciences). In both cases, the variants per study option are de…ned accordingly, i.e. as the actual programs o¤ered under the de…ned study option. Note that this framework also covers the general case of no aggregation: simply de…ne the study options as the institution and the actual program. Each study option then goes with a single variant, so that K j = 1 for all j.
An individual i's utility for study option j and variant k, U ijk , is the sum of a deterministic component V ijk and a random component " ijk , i.e. U ijk = V ijk + " ijk . Assume that there is no choice-speci…c information at the level of the variant k. Hence, the deterministic component of utility is the same for each variant k of study option j, V ijk = V ij for all k. Individual i's utility for study option j and variant k is then given by:
Individual i's utility for the no-study option is:
The random component of utility follows the distributional assumptions of a three-level nested logit model (McFadden (1978)) . At the highest level, there are two nests: the study nest S, which includes the study options and their variants; and the no-study nest, which is a degenerate nest with only alternative 0. At the lower level, the study nest S consists of the J di¤erent study option nests, j = 1 J. At the lowest level, each study option nest j consists of the K j variants. The distribution of the " ijk and " i0 has a sequential structure with two parameters, and . The parameter roughly measures the extent to which the " ijk show correlation between the J study option nests within the study nest S (i.e. correlation relative to the no-study option 0). Similarly, the parameter measures the extent to which the " ijk show additional correlation across the K j variants within a given study option nest j.
16 A parameter close to zero means that the correlation is weak, while a parameter close to one means that the correlation is strong. To illustrate, if = = 0 the model reduces to 16 There is no parameter for the no-study nest, since it is a degenerate nest. Furthermore, we assume that the parameter is common for all J study option nests. It would be straightforward to allow this parameter to vary across the study option nests, e.g. according to the institution or program type or program …eld. a simple logit model with no correlation between the " ijk . As another example, if = 0 and = 1, then there is no correlation of the " ijk between the study option nests, while there is perfect correlation between the variants within each study option nest.
Individuals choose the alternative that maximizes random utility U ijk . The nested logit model is consistent with random utility maximization if 0 1 (McFadden (1978)), i.e. correlation parameters are between zero and one, with a weaker correlation between than within the study option nests. Because the distribution of the " ijk and " i0 has a sequential structure, the nested logit model yields simple expressions for the conditional choice probabilities: the probability of choosing a variant k within a study option nest P ijkjj , the probability of choosing a study option j within the study nest P ijjS , and the probability of choosing the study nest P iS . We are not interested in the probability that individual i chooses variant k of study option j, i.e. P ijk = P ijkjj P ijjS P iS , since there is no choice-speci…c variation at the level of the variant k, V ijk = V ij . Our interest is thus only in the aggregate probability that individual i chooses any variant of study option j, i.e. P ij = P ijjS P iS . Applying the formulas for the three-level nested logit model, the probability P ij for j = 1 J is:
Since the variants k within study option nest j have the same utility, V ijk = V ij for all k, this can be simpli…ed to:
where V ij = V ij +(1 ) ln(K j ) can be interpreted as the aggregate utility of a study option j. This shows that we can consider a simpli…ed two-level nested logit model at the level of the study option j, after simply including ln(K j ) as a correction term to V ij ; see also Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) . The correction term captures the extent of unobserved heterogeneity within a study option. It drops out if (1 ) is equal to zero: the utilities of the variants of the same study option are perfectly correlated (homogeneous), so that additional variants do not lead to a higher aggregate utility of that study option. Note that the correction term also drops out in the general case of no aggregation, since in this case K j = 1 for all j.
The probability that i chooses the no-study option P i0 is simply:
It is instructive to compare this model to Long (2004) , who has been the only author to consider the study options at the level of the individual institution. First, she does not include a correction term (1 ) ln(K j ) to the utility terms of the study options. This is a special case of our model if = 1, i.e. homogeneity of the variants within the institution. Second, Long estimates her model sequentially. In a …rst step, she models the probability where to study, conditional on choosing to study, i.e. P ij=S in our notation. In a second step, she models the probability whether or not to study, i.e. P iS and P i0 , using the characteristics of the predicted most preferred alternative as explanatory variables in the deterministic component of utility. This may also be viewed as a special case of our model for = 1. Indeed, as goes to one, we have (1 ) ln
, so that P iS , as given by the second part of (1), reduces to Long's binary choice model. 
Indirect utility
We specify the deterministic component of utility V ij of individual i for alternative j as a conditional indirect utility function. It depends on the expected bene…ts, including monetary returns in the form of increased future salaries, and on the expected costs, i.e. the non-monetary costs of studying and the monetary costs in the form of tuition fees and travel costs. In our application, tuition fees are low and do not show any variation across alternatives. However, individuals pay an implicit price in the form of travel or commuting costs: transportation costs and the opportunity cost of time. We consider the following speci…cation of V ij :
where w i is a vector of individual characteristics (sex, age, high school background, etc.), y i is individual i's annual income, t j is the tuition fee for study option j (currently uniform at about e 500 for all j 6 = 0, but possibly di¤erentiated across study options after policy reform), and g(x ij ) is the implicit price paid by individual i for alternative j, which is a function of the annual travel or commuting costs x ij . In principle, one may include a full set of alternative-speci…c intercepts j and alternativespeci…c slope vectors j (relative to one base alternative). For example, women may have a di¤erent valuation for every alternative than men. In practice, such ‡exibility would imply a very large number of parameters to be estimated, since the set of alternatives is large, and there are many individual characteristics in the vector w i . To reduce the number of parameters, we will summarize the alternative-speci…c e¤ects j and j by a more limited set of characteristics, i.e. the institution's religious orientation, the program type and the program …eld. A more precise discussion of the included variables is given in the next section.
The second part of (3) refers to the utility derived from the consumption on other goods (i.e. other than the educational choice), after spending an implicit price g(x ij ), which is an increasing function of the annual commuting costs x ij . The parameter i can be interpreted as the marginal utility of income of individual i. It can be used to quickly reinterpret the other parameters such as the j in (3) in monetary terms (by simply dividing j by i ), and to conduct a more complete welfare analysis.
The annual commuting costs x ij of individual i for alternative j consist of two components: transportation costs and the opportunity cost of time (McFadden and Train (1978) ). The transportation costs (in Euro) are proportional to the distance per trip d ij (in km). The opportunity cost of time (also in Euro) is proportional to the travel time per trip t ij (in min). More precisely, specify the annual commuting costs as x ij = 75d ij + 40t ij .
18 Each individual has two options: commute or go on residence. If she commutes, her implicit price for alternative j is simply g(x ij ) = x ij . If she goes on residence, she saves a fraction of the trips, but pays an extra annual cost on rent r j . Her implicit price is correspondingly g(x ij ) = (1 )x ij + r j . A cost-minimizing individual commutes if x ij r j , and goes on residence otherwise. Intuitively, commuting is preferred if the annual commuting costs are su¢ ciently small relative to the annual cost of rent. The deterministic component of utility (3) for a cost-minimizing individual can then be written as:
where I( ) is an indicator function equal to 1 if the expression inside the brackets is positive, and equal to 0 otherwise. Utility thus decreases in the commuting costs x ij in a piecewise linear way: at a steeper rate i for low values of x ij (when the pupil commutes), and at a ‡atter rate i for high values of x ij (when the pupil goes on residence). The utility speci…cation (4) holds for the J study options, j = 1 J, as well as for the no-study option 0. For the study options, x ij has the clear interpretation of the commuting costs of individual i to study option j. This may clearly vary across individuals and study options. For the no-study option, x i0 can be interpreted as the commuting costs to work. We assume this to be constant across individuals, x i0 = x 0 , and to be su¢ ciently small so that the last term does not enter in V i0 .
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It is again instructive to compare this speci…cation to Long (2004) . She allows utility to vary quadratically with distance, and …nds that utility decreases with distance at a decreasing rate. Our commuter/resident speci…cation yields the same degree of ‡exibility. In fact, a speci…cation of V ij that is quadratic in x ij indeed gave a similar …t. The advantage of our approach in this context is that the coe¢ cient of x ij , i.e. i , can also be interpreted as the marginal utility of income. In Long's speci…cation, the price (i.e. tuition fee) coe¢ cient can be directly interpreted as the marginal utility of income, but this coe¢ cient is not identi…ed here since tuition fees show no variation across alternatives. In sum, our speci…cation allows us to capture the role of distance in the same ‡exible way as Long's, while at the same time providing us a marginal utility of income coe¢ cient in the absence of any variation of a direct measure of price.
Estimation
The choice probabilities (1) and (2) may be used to construct the likelihood function and estimate the model. There are, however, practical di¢ culties due to the size of our data set.
There is a very large number of individuals (55; 905).
Each individual can choose from a very large number of alternatives (563, including the no-study alternative).
The associated choice-speci…c variables need to be interacted with many individual characteristics (the demographic and high school background variables).
There are several ways to reduce the size of the data set: aggregation over alternatives, sampling over alternatives, and sampling over individuals. We adopt a combination of these approaches.
First, we aggregate over alternatives. Using the framework in section 3.1, we aggregate the variants k to the level of the study option j by adding the correction term (1 ) ln(K j ) to V ij . We consider two de…nitions of the study option j. Our "aggregate" model de…nes the study options as the 53 di¤erent institutions. This model serves as a useful benchmark since it considers the same aggregation level as in Long (2004) . It discards, however, almost 19 The exact value of x 0 is irrelevant and can be normalized since it is not separately identi…ed from 0 .
all of the information on the study programs (except for including the correction term for the number of programs o¤ered at the institution ln(K j )). Since this is a main source of richness of our data, which we want to exploit in our empirical analysis, we will focus on a "disaggregate"model. This model de…nes the study options as the 154 di¤erent institutions, program types, and program …elds (though it still aggregates over the actual programs within a …eld, e.g. nursing which is one of the vocational social sciences programs). Utility V ij can then be speci…ed to depend on both the institutions' characteristics and on the program characteristics down to the level of the program …eld.
Second, we sample over alternatives; this is only necessary to estimate our disaggregate model. In simple logit models one can randomly select a reduced choice set for each individual, and de…ne the choice probabilities as if the individuals only faced this reduced choice set. Maximum likelihood estimation based on these as-if choice probabilities yields consistent estimates (McFadden (1978) ). We extend this approach to the nested logit model by exploiting its sequential structure. We …rst consider the probability of choosing a study option j, conditional on choosing to study, i.e. P ijjS entering as the …rst term in (1). This is a simple logit probability, so that it is possible to sample over alternatives and obtain consistent estimates. More precisely, for each student we construct a reduced choice set of 20 study options, i.e. the chosen study option and a random sample of 19 other study options. This gives consistent estimates for the parameters entering the study option utilities V ij . We subsequently consider the probability whether to study, i.e. P ijS entering as the second term in (1). Provided that the utilities of all the study options are now included, as computed from the parameter estimates of the …rst stage, this yields consistent estimates of the parameters entering the no-study option V i0 and of the distributional parameter . Since this is a two-step estimation procedure, the standard formulas for the standard errors of the parameters computed in the second step (i.e. those for the no-study option and ) are not correct. We follow the general procedure of Murphy and Topel (1985) to obtain the corrected standard errors.
Finally, we sample over individuals. In general, there is a trade-o¤ between sampling over alternatives and sampling over individuals (doubling the size of the sampled choice set implies halving the number of individuals to keep the size of the data set …xed). Our experience showed that it is more e¢ cient to sample over the alternatives than over the individuals, in particular to identify the utility e¤ects of some relatively unpopular alternatives with few observations. We therefore sampled much less heavily over individuals than over alternatives. For both the aggregate and the disaggregate models we sampled about 20; 000 out of the 55; 905 individuals, as compared to a sampled choice set of 20 out of the 155 alternatives.
Alternative speci…cations
We compare three di¤erent models.
In the aggregate logit model the choice alternatives are at the level of the institution. The choice set thus consists of 54 alternatives, i.e. 53 study options and one no-study option.
In the aggregate nested logit model the choice alternatives are again at the level of the institution, but there is now a nesting parameter that may be di¤erent from 0. This allows for unobserved heterogeneity in that individuals may have correlated preferences across the 53 study options, even after conditioning on the observable characteristics.
In the disaggregate nested logit model the choice set consists of 155 alternatives (including one no-study option), referring to the institutions, the program types (long and short vocational, and academic) and the program …elds (exact sciences, biomedical sciences, social sciences and arts). There is again a nesting parameter to allow for correlated preferences across the 154 study options.
The …rst two speci…cations correspond to the previous literature, which also looked at the participation and schooling decisions at the aggregate institution level. As mentioned earlier, there are still two important di¤erences with the most comprehensive study to date, i.e. Long (2004) : the inclusion of the correction term ln(K j ) to account for the aggregation over the di¤erent programs within each institution; and the integrated consideration of the participation and schooling decisions. The third speci…cation is at the more detailed level of the institution and the program …eld, which has not been considered in previous work. Since this third speci…cation is the most general, we will focus our discussion around it, and use the results from the two aggregate models mainly as a point of comparison with previous work.
It remains to specify the variables entering the indirect utility V ij as given by (4), i.e. the individual characteristics entering w i and i , and the choice characteristics entering j and j . The vector of individual characteristics w i includes the following 12 variables: sex, nationality, years of repetition during high school (age 18), high school's religious orientation (catholic or not), and 8 variables referring to the type of high school education (i.e. various forms of general and technical high school, relative to a professional high school education). Similarly, we specify the marginal utility of income or the commuting cost parameter i to depend on the full vector of individual characteristics w i . Hence, i = w 0 i , where is the corresponding vector of parameters.
The number of alternative-speci…c intercepts j and slope vectors j is very large. In particular, in the disaggregate model with 155 choice alternatives and 12 individual characteristics in w i , there are up to 154 + 154 12 = 2002 parameters to be estimated. To make estimation and interpretation feasible, we therefore put some structure on j and j . The intercepts j are speci…ed to depend on a full set of institution, program type and program …eld dummy variables. The slope l j corresponding to each individual's characteristic l depends on the following choice characteristics: a dummy variable for the no-study option ( l 0 ), and a set of dummy variables characterizing the study options: the religious a¢ liation of the institution (catholic or not), the program type (short-term vocational, long-term vocational or academic) and the program …eld (exact sciences, biomedical sciences, social sciences, or arts). We take the following study option as the base: a non-catholic institution o¤ering a short-term vocational program in the …eld of arts. Hence, all estimated slopes l j should be estimated relative to that base.
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Descriptive statistics on the individual characteristics entering w i and i , unconditional and conditional on the chosen alternative, were presented and discussed earlier in Table 3 .
Empirical results
We begin with a discussion of the parameter estimates, to uncover the determinants of the participation and schooling decisions. Next, we summarize our key results through the cost elasticities implied by our estimates. Finally, we draw some implications on the welfare e¤ects of uniform and di¤erentiated tuition fee increases.
Parameter estimates
Tables 4 and 5 present the empirical results. Table 4 compares the estimates of several parameters across the three di¤erent models (aggregate logit, aggregate nested logit, and disaggregate nested logit): the nesting parameters and , the slope parameters entering the utility of the no-study option ( 0 ) and the commuting cost parameters ( ). Table 5 shows the slope parameters entering the utility of the study options ( j , j 6 = 0). This table only 20 In the two aggregate models with 54 alternatives, the number of alternative-speci…c intercepts j and the alternative-speci…c slopes j is lower, i.e. 53 + 53 12 = 702, so that estimation of all parameters would be easier. However, for ease of comparison and interpretation we adopt a more parsimonious speci…cation that is similar to the disaggregate model. The only di¤erence is that the j and j obviously no longer include dummy variables referring to long-term vocational program type and to the program …elds.
shows the estimates for the disaggregate nested logit model, since there are many of these parameters. 21 We …rst discuss the observed and unobserved determinants of participation ( 0 and in Table 4 ). Next, we highlight the role of mobility costs in both participation and schooling ( in Table 4 ). Third, we discuss the determinants of schooling ( j , j 6 = 0 in Table 5 ). Finally, we brie ‡y discuss the aggregation parameter ( in Table 4 ).
Observed and unobserved determinants of participation ( 0 and )
The top part of Table 4 shows how individuals di¤er in their valuation of the no-study option. We focus our discussion on the estimates of the most general disaggregate nested logit model (third column). Males and especially foreigners have a signi…cantly higher utility from staying out of higher education. The same holds true for older pupils, i.e. those who experienced repetitions during high school. Pupils from a catholic high school have a signi…cantly lower utility from staying out than others. This is consistent with the reputation of the catholic high schools in providing a strong preparation for a higher education.
The most important individual characteristics a¤ecting the participation decision relate to the pupils'type of high school. Pupils with a technical and especially those with a general high school education have a substantially lower utility from staying out relative to the pupils from a professional high school. This may be either due to the acquired or due to the intrinsic skills of these pupils. So one should be cautious and not conclude that promoting general high school education will improve participation in higher education. What matters for our purposes, is only that the type of high school background does play an important role, which will be re ‡ected in our estimated cost elasticities. Finally, while the type of high school plays a crucial role, the speci…c discipline followed at the high school does not matter much in the participation decision. None of the so-called more di¢ cult general high school disciplines, such as mathematics or classical languages, matter in the participation decision.
Most of the estimated 0 are of a similar order magnitude in the more restrictive aggregate models, but there are some important di¤erences. For example, the aggregate logit model estimates pupils with a catholic high school background to have a higher utility from staying out, in contrast with common wisdom. This illustrates the importance of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity a¤ecting the participation decision, as captured by the nesting parameter . While the logit model restricts to be equal to zero, the nested logit model estimates it as 0:9 and 0:95 in the aggregate and disaggregate versions. Hence, pupils have 21 A comparison of the parameters in j across models does not yield any main additional insights. Many of the parameters do not enter in the aggregate models, and the ones that do (relating to the institutions' religious a¢ liation and program type) were usually estimated to be similar. strongly correlated preferences across all study options and view them as close substitutes relative to the no-study option.
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In sum, while several observed individual characteristics a¤ect the utility of the no-study option, there remains a lot of unobserved heterogeneity a¤ecting the participation decision.
The role of mobility costs in participation and schooling ( )
The next question concerns the role of the annual commuting costs, a¤ecting the valuations of the study options relative to the no-study option. Table 4 shows that the annual commuting costs have a negative and highly signi…cant e¤ect on utility (an estimate of 6:46 and a t-statistic of 17:84 in the third speci…cation). Furthermore, the parameter = 0:49 shows that the e¤ect of commuting costs is not linear but decreasing. Students who live suf…ciently far and go on residence save 49% on the commuting costs (to be traded o¤ against their …xed renting costs). The e¤ect of the commuting costs di¤ers across individuals in some respects, for example pupils from a catholic high school are somewhat less cost sensitive. Pupils from a technical high school with a social orientation appear to be more cost sensitive than others. Overall, however, mobility costs do not show much signi…cant variation across individuals.
Commuting costs thus have a highly signi…cant e¤ect, but do they play a quantitatively important role in the pupils'participation decision? Or are they more relevant for the schooling decision, i.e. the decision where and what to study? Since the commuting costs enter the utility of the no-study option and the study options with a common parameter i , it would appear that they may have a similar e¤ect on both the participation and the schooling decisions. However, this is only the case in the logit model. The nested logit models showed that pupils value the various study options as close substitutes for each other, relative to the no-study option. Our estimate of = 0:95 implies that pupils are actually up to 1=(1 0:95) = 20 times more responsive to commuting costs in their schooling decision than in their participation decision (see (1)). An increase in the mobility costs of one of the study options would thus generate substantial shifts in demand to other study options. But an increase in the mobility costs of the no-study option would have much smaller e¤ects. In this sense, the pupils'mobility is a relative matter. Most pupils choose a study option close to their homes because they have a lot of study options in their neighborhood and they view these as close substitutes to more distant alternatives. But those pupils who do not have nearby access to any study option, would be willing to travel high amounts. These …ndings will be con…rmed in our subsequent analysis, where we report the cost elasticities implied by our estimates. Table 5 shows how individuals di¤er in their valuations of the various study options. The base study option is a non-catholic institution o¤ering a short-term vocational program, in the …eld of arts. To obtain an idea of the quantitative importance of the parameter estimates, one may compute the additional willingness to pay relative to the base study option in monetary terms (in e 10,000's), by simply dividing the coe¢ cients by the marginal utility of income i . Table 5 reveals several interesting …ndings.
Determinants of schooling ( j )
The …rst column shows how individuals value catholic institutions of higher education. Few variables play a role, but the one exception is the religious orientation of the pupil's former high school. The coe¢ cient of 1:05 is highly signi…cant and it is also quantitatively important. It amounts to an additional willingness to pay for a catholic institution by pupils from a catholic high school of e 10,000 1.05 / (6.46-0.45) = e 1,750. This indicates that there are still strong linkages between the religious networks.
The next two columns show the valuations for the program type, i.e. academic or long term-term vocational programs (relative to short-term vocational). Interestingly, males and foreigners have a higher valuation for academic or long-term vocational programs. Hence, while they have a lower utility from participation (as we saw before), they do have a stronger preference for the long-term programs conditional on participating. Pupils who experienced years of repetition during high school have a lower utility from participating in the longterm programs, whether vocational or academic. The type of high school plays a signi…cant role: pupils with the intellectually more demanding general high school background are not only more likely to participate, but they also choose the more demanding vocational long and especially academic program types. Their additional willingness to pay for academic programs at universities than for short-term vocational programs at colleges amounts to e10,000 2.71 / (6.46-0.36) = e 4,440. Furthermore, while we earlier found that the speci…c discipline taken at a general high school does not matter for participation, it does matter for the type of higher education program. Pupils with a general high school background in science, mathematics and classical languages have a substantially higher valuation for the academic or long-term vocational programs than for the short-term programs. Most notably, pupils who took classical languages would be willing to pay an additional e 10,000 1.88 / (6.46-0.53) = e 3,170 to follow an academic rather than a short-term vocational program, relative to comparable other general high school pupils.
The …nal three columns show the valuations for the speci…c program …elds. The type of high school and the speci…c discipline followed at high school play the quantitatively most important roles. Generally speaking, pupils prefer the program …elds that closely match the discipline they followed at high school. For example, pupils who followed science or mathematics at a general high school prefer sciences, whereas pupils who followed classical languages prefer arts. These …ndings stress the central importance of the high school background in the subsequent higher education decision, in contrast to some claims that the general high school leaves the options open for all study options at the higher education level.
It is interesting to point out that the gender e¤ect also comes out strong in explaining di¤erences in valuations across the study …elds. Females have a strong preference for arts and especially biomedical sciences, and the weakest preference for exact sciences, as compared to males. While this seems to simply con…rm common wisdom, it is important to stress that these gender e¤ects are found even after having controlled for gender di¤erences in the high school education background. For example, females have a lower willingness to pay for exact sciences than arts of e 2,400 relative to males, even if they both have the same science high school background.
Aggregation ( )
Finally, consider the aggregation parameter , which is interacted with the log of the number of variants K j available at aggregate study option j. It measures the degree to which preferences are correlated across the K j variants over which we aggregated. In the two aggregate models, < , which is inconsistent with the restrictions of the nested logit model. 23 In the third, "disaggregate" model, = 0:955 > , but it is still quite close to .
This means that preferences only show weak additional correlation over the variants available at each study option. This …nding suggests the need for even more detailed disaggregate analysis, to study educational choices at even more disaggregate levels. We leave this as a topic for further research.
Cost elasticities
Many of our empirical …ndings can be summarized by the own-and cross-cost elasticities of demand. We focus on the semi-elasticities, de…ned as the percentage change in the number of students in response to an absolute increase in the monetary costs x ij of a given study option or subset of study options. We consider here an absolute cost increase by e 1,000 (or equivalently, given our de…nition of x ij , an increase in the daily commuting distance by 9km for a pupil traveling at a speed of 60km/h).
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The estimated cost elasticities provide information as to how participation and schooling would change in response to uniform or di¤erentiated tuition fee increases. They may also give a …rst impression on the possible e¤ects of a rationalization of supply, which is essentially a very large cost increase for a subset of study options. Finally, the cost elasticities are informative in interpreting the results of a more complete welfare analysis of reform.
We compute the cost elasticities at three di¤erent levels: the level of the market, the program type (colleges versus universities), and the program …elds. Table 6 considers the e¤ects of a uniform cost increase by e 1,000 on colleges (…rst column), universities (second column), and overall participation (third column). The …rst panel compares the elasticities as implied by the aggregate logit, the aggregate nested logit and the disaggregate nested logit. The results di¤er dramatically. While the logit model would predict overall participation to drop by a substantial 13:79%, the aggregate nested logit model predicts a drop of only 1:62%, and the disaggregate nested logit model a drop of an even lower 0:91%. These large di¤erences across models follow from our …nding that pupils have quite strongly correlated preferences across study options, i.e. they perceive the various study options as close substitutes ( = 0:95). Hence, while mobility costs matter in their schooling decisions, they play only a limited role in their participation decisions. In all models the relative drop in students is larger at colleges than at universities, e.g. 1:09% versus 0:51% in the disaggregate nested logit model; the absolute drop at colleges is even higher since colleges have a larger market share.
Uniform cost increase
The second panel shows how the elasticities di¤er among pupils. Males and foreigners are more likely to drop out than others. For example, male students would drop their overall participation by 1:07% compared to a drop of 0:78% for female students.
25 Students with no repetitions are less likely to drop out than students with one or two years of repetition ( 0:65% versus 1:41% and 2:14%). The most important di¤erences are found between students from di¤erent high school background: students with a general high 24 More formally, denote the predicted probability that individual i chooses study option j by b P ij (x i ), where
x iJ ) is the J 1 vector of individual i's monetary costs for the various study options. Let be a J 1 vector of ones and zeros, where the ones denote the study options for which there is a cost increase by e 1000: The semi-elasticity of demand for all study options j 2 A with respect to a cost increase 1000 is then de…ned as P
For example, suppose that the set A consists of all study options and all elements in are equal to 1. The semi-elasticity then refers to the percentage change in the total number of students in response to a uniform cost increase by e 1000. 25 The ratio of these changes is similar to the odds ratio, which is equal to exp( l 0 ) for the l-th individual characteristic.
school background would reduce participation by only 0:5%, whereas students from technical and professional high schools would drop participation by, respectively, 1:35% and 2:58%. In sum, the empirical results show that the overall demand for higher education is highly inelastic, although there are some clear di¤erences between individuals.
Cost increases by program type: colleges versus universities
Additional insights are obtained by considering the cost elasticities at lower levels of aggregation. Table 7 presents the semi-elasticities at the level of the program type: vocational programs at colleges versus academic programs at universities. Cost increases by colleges only or by universities only evidently have even smaller e¤ects on total participation (last column). However, underlying these small total e¤ects, there are large shifts in demand. A e 1,000 cost increase to all colleges reduces college demand by almost 13%, and a e 1,000 cost increase to all universities reduces university demand by an even larger 24%. These …ndings are consistent with our earlier discussion on the role of mobility costs. Since pupils have strongly correlated preferences across study options, they are quite willing to substitute between colleges and universities in response to a di¤erentiated cost increase, even though they are unlikely to refrain from participation altogether.
We can use these results to assess the government's historic e¤orts to promote participation by investing in a large college network with a broad geographic coverage. Our estimated cost elasticities suggest that these e¤orts only have a negligible e¤ect on total participation. The investment e¤orts thus mainly lead to a substitution from universities to colleges. In this sense, we may conclude that the government's policy has essentially not lead to more democratization, but rather to a diversion away from universities. This relates to Rouse's (1995) …ndings on the impact of U.S. community colleges on educational attainment. She also found that colleges did not increase the likelihood of attendance (though they may have led to an increase in the number of years of schooling). However, even if the promotion of colleges did not have an e¤ect on democratization, this does not mean it is undesirable. The diversion to colleges may be e¢ cient or ine¢ cient depending on the bene…ts to pupils and the di¤erent costs of supplying education at colleges and universities. We will turn to that question in our welfare analysis below.
Cost increases by program …eld
Cost elasticities at the lower level of the program …eld provide interesting additional information. For example, they are relevant in assessing regulatory policies to promote certain study programs. They are also of interest in assessing the e¤ects of introducing di¤erentiated tuition fees. To our knowledge, there are no previous estimates of elasticities in higher education at the level of the program …eld. Table 8 shows the estimated semi-elasticities for eight disciplines (arts, social sciences, biomedical sciences, and exact sciences; of either the vocational or the academic type). The own-cost elasticities on the diagonals show that pupils are quite cost-sensitive for all disciplines. The elasticities tend to be lower for the disciplines with the higher market share. For example, vocational biomedical sciences have by far the highest market share and also the lowest own-cost elasticity. However, market share is not the only relevant factor. For example, academic social sciences and vocational exact sciences have a similar market share, but pupils are much more cost sensitive towards the former.
The cross-cost elasticities reveal several additional interesting patterns. It is best to read the cross-elasticities by row. Notice …rst that the cross-cost elasticities would be the same for all …elds on the same row if all individuals were identical (no observed or unobserved heterogeneity). This follows from the IIA property of the logit model, saying that identical pupils shift proportionally to other alternatives. We earlier found however that pupil heterogeneity does matter in explaining educational choices. This is indeed re ‡ected in the pattern of cross-cost elasticities, which vary widely within each row of the table. For example, the last row shows that a rise in the costs of academic exact sciences would generate much more substitution to other academic sciences than to vocational sciences; and among the vocational sciences the gains would mainly go to the vocational exact sciences.
This example illustrates a more general pattern for the cross-cost elasticities: pupils tend to mainly substitute within the academic or within the vocational program types, and to the extent that they substitute across types they would especially choose the "twin"program …eld of the other type. There is thus generally a dominance of the program type dimension over the program …eld dimension. In a few cases this dominance is somewhat weak: vocational exact sciences loose a comparatively high amount to academic sciences (fourth row), and academic arts loose relatively much to vocational arts (…fth row). In one case the dominance of the program type over the program …eld is actually reversed: vocational arts loose more to academic arts than to any other vocational program (…rst row). This is consistent with the high quality reputation of the vocational arts programs relative to academic arts (e.g. the language interpreter programs).
As a …nal remark, note that exact sciences and biomedical sciences are the closest neighbors, and so are social sciences and arts: in almost all cases, substitution mainly occurs to these neighbors. The only exception occurs on the second and third columns, where it appears that vocational biomedical and vocational social sciences are closest neighbors. This can be explained by the nature of many of these vocational programs (e.g. nursing).
Concluding remarks
The estimated elasticities show that uniform cost increases have little overall e¤ects on the demand for higher education, though they can somewhat change the composition of demand. In contrast, cost increases by program type and program …eld lead to large shifts in the composition. One may use these …ndings to draw some tentative conclusions on policy reform. On the one hand, the low market-level elasticities suggest that a uniform tuition fee may generate large distributional e¤ects, and comparatively lower total welfare improvements. On the other hand, the large elasticities at the level of the program type and program …eld, suggest that di¤erentiated tuition fee increases may involve additional distributional and welfare e¤ects. To obtain more insights, we turn to an illustrative welfare analysis next.
Implications for policy reform
To illustrate how our empirical results can be useful in assessing policy reform, we focus on the e¤ects of raising tuition fees within a centralized public system, i.e. keeping other things such as the quality and the diversity of supply constant. Such an analysis is highly relevant since, as we have seen in section 2, fees are currently far from su¢ cient to cover even the variable cost per student, let alone the …xed costs. An analysis of more drastic reforms, such as decentralizing decision making to the institutions, is beyond the scope of this paper, since it would require a better empirical understanding on how the institutions of higher education compete.
Framework
We make the following assumptions.
Pupils can borrow at a competitive interest rate to …nance their educational expenses. This ensures that increases in tuition fees do not cause pupils to drop out because of capital constraints. Barr (2004) and others have discussed how this can be accomplished through appropriately designed income-contingent student loans.
Pupils can deduct their educational expenses from their (future) taxable income. This ensures that a progressive income tax system does not distort the incentives to invest in higher education; see Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Jacobs and Vanderploeg (2005) .
The private (Mincer) returns to higher education are equal to the social returns, i.e. there are no spillovers to others from investing in higher education. Based on a discussion of the available micro and macro empirical evidence, Jacobs and van der Ploeg (2005) conclude that this is a realistic assumption. It allows us to directly use the estimates of our random utility discrete choice model to compute the changes in consumer surplus after a change in tuition fees.
The government can regulate the colleges and universities, so that they do not change the quality or diversity of supply in response to an increase in tuition fees. Variable subsidies are granted on a cost basis. This allows us to treat the government and the higher education institutions as an integrated entity, and use the government's net revenues (tuition fee revenues minus the subsidy costs) as a measure of producer surplus.
Progressive income taxes ensure the socially desirable income distribution. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) provide conditions under which this is the case. This allows us to abstract from equity considerations.
Based on these assumptions we can assess the welfare e¤ects of tuition fee increases in terms of consumer and producer surplus. Write the indirect utility V ij = V ij + (1 ) ln(K j ), where V ij is given by (4), as a function of the J 1 tuition fee vector t = (t 1 t J ) , i.e. V ij = V ij (t) for j 6 = 0. The nested logit model gives the following expression for pupil i's expected surplus as a function of t (see e.g. McFadden (1981) ):
The average consumer surplus per pupil is CS = P I i=1 CS i =I, where I is the number of pupils. The variable part of producer surplus per pupil (or government's variable net revenue) for a speci…c study option j, as a function of t, is equal to
where P ij (t) is the probability that individual i chooses program j as a function of t, and c j is the constant variable cost per student of program j. Total producer surplus per pupil is P S(t) = P J j=1 P S j (t)=I. Direct estimates of the variable cost per student c j are not available. As an indirect measure we use the government's variable subsidy per student, since these are granted on a cost basis as discussed in section 2. Table 2 summarized how the variable subsidies, and hence the estimated variable costs, tend to be higher for the biomedical and exact sciences, especially at the universities. We will present the results from the estimated variable costs of the second panel of Table 2 , but the results are very similar when the alternative estimates in the …rst panel were used.
The most simple welfare analysis would simply look at the sum of consumer and producer surplus. However, this would ignore that the social costs of public funds may be greater than zero, i.e. that the government may need to levy distortionary taxes elsewhere to …nance a higher education de…cit. Estimates of the social costs of public funds vary widely, from e 0.17 to over e 1.65 per euro of public funds raised as discussed in Bird (2005) . Diewert, Lawrence and Thompson (1998) suggest using a number of at least e 0.23. We take a conservative approach and compute total welfare as CS(t) + (1 + )P S(t), where is either equal to 0, or equal to Diewert et al.' s 0.23. Table 9 shows the e¤ects of both uniform and di¤erentiated tuition fee increases. The …rst two columns show the size of the considered fee increases. The next four columns show the e¤ects on per pupil consumer surplus, net revenues and total welfare assuming the cost of public funds is either zero or e 0.23. The …nal two columns show the associated e¤ects on participation.
Findings
The …rst row shows the e¤ects of a "small"uniform tuition fee increase of e 1,000. This is small in the sense that it is still insu¢ cient to cover the variable costs per student (see Table 2 ). Consumer surplus drops by e 657 per pupil. 27 Producer surplus increases by an amount of e 670 per pupil. Hence, there are large distributional e¤ects from students to the government (tax payers). The total welfare increase depends on how one values the increase in producer surplus: it increases by a small e 13 per pupil if the social costs of public funds are zero ( = 1), but by a much higher amount of e 167 if = 0:23. The second row compares the e 1,000 uniform increase with a di¤erentiated fee increase that yields an equivalent increase in producer surplus: we take a fee increase of e 750 at colleges, which requires a fee increase of e 1,579 at universities to keep producer surplus constant. This di¤erentiated fee increase implies that welfare increases by an additional e 12 per pupil relative to the uniform fee increase. This increase is due to a shift in demand from the universities to the colleges, which operate at a lower variable cost (Table 2 ). This shows that the earlier discussed diversion e¤ects to colleges are not necessarily bad from a total welfare point of view. Nevertheless, it is also striking that di¤erentiating fees between colleges and universities only improves total welfare by a small amount: we attribute this to the fact that the shift to the colleges does not only imply a lower variable cost of supply, but also a lower bene…t to the pupils.
To gain further insights we subsequently consider the e¤ects of more drastic cost-based fee increases, i.e. fee increases that are su¢ cient to exactly cover the variable part of producer surplus. The third row of Table 9 considers the e¤ect of a uniform cost-based fee increase, which amounts to a required fee increase by e 2,810. Since the variable costs per student vary across program types and …elds, such a fee increase implies some cross-subsidization from colleges to universities, and from arts and social sciences to biomedical sciences and exact sciences. By construction, (variable) producer surplus becomes zero, an increase by e 1,852 per pupil relative to the status quo. There is therefore a large shift in distribution from students to producers (the government). Total welfare increases by the small amount of e 22 per pupil if = 0, and by the much larger amount of e 448 if = 0:23.
The fourth row shows how welfare further improves after a di¤erentiated cost-based fee increase, i.e. such that the variable costs of each individual program are covered (implying no longer a cross-subsidization). If = 0, these tuition fees are also the …rst-best levels. Total welfare now increases by an additional e 100 relative to the uniform cost-based fee increase. This shows that fee di¤erentiation has some modest e¤ect on total welfare, but the e¤ect should not be exaggerated.
The …nal row of Table 9 considers the welfare e¤ects of adding a uniform markup over the cost-based levels. To illustrate, we consider a uniform markup of e 5,000, which is roughly su¢ cient to cover the …xed costs of higher education (in addition to the variable costs). If = 0, such a uniform markup lowers welfare relative to the …rst-best cost-based fees (by about e 80 per pupil), but it still raises welfare relative to the status quo (by the small amount of e 36 per pupil). In contrast, if = 0:23 total welfare per pupil further increases by e 1,150 relative to the status quo.
28 Note that we also considered the welfare e¤ects from introducing non-uniform markups over marginal costs (i.e. Ramsey pricing), to exploit di¤erences in the elasticities; we found that the additional gains are negligible, which is due to the fact that the estimated program-level cost elasticities are quite large and similar to each other (see Table 8 ). This discussion focused on the e¤ect of tuition fee increases on total welfare. To gain additional intuition, the last two columns of Table 9 show how participation changes in response to the tuition fee increases. Consistent with our earlier discussed cost elasticities, overall participation generally does not drop by very much for the small fee increases (drop by less than 1%) but also not for the more drastic cost-based fee increases (drop of slightly more than 2%). Only if fees increase to have a e 5,000 markup, participation drops considerably ( 7%). As a …nal point, the di¤erentiated fee increases are accompanied by substantial student shifts from the universities to the colleges. This again emphasizes that a diversion of students from university to colleges is not necessarily harmful from a total welfare perspective, due to the associated variable cost savings.
Concluding remarks
We can summarize this discussion as follows. First, uniform cost-based tuition fee increases achieve most of the welfare gains; the additional gains from fee di¤erentiation are relatively unimportant. The welfare increases are relatively large even under conservative assumptions on the social cost of public funds. If one ignores the social cost of public funds, the welfare gains are relatively small, but there is still a substantial redistribution from students to outsiders.
Conclusions
We have analyzed the determinants of participation and schooling in a public system of higher education, using a unique data set on pupils' study choices. One of our central …ndings is that pupils perceive the available institutions and programs as close substitutes, implying an ambiguous role for travel costs: they hardly a¤ect the participation decisions, but have a strong impact on the schooling decisions. In addition, high school background plays an important role in both participation and schooling. Our empirical analysis generalizes previous work, which has focused on the participation rather than the schooling decision (where and what to study). Based on information of travel costs, we can indirectly infer the e¤ects from raising costs including tuition fees at a high level of detail.
Our empirical results can contribute to informing the debate on reforming public systems of higher education. As an illustration, we have assessed the e¤ects of tuition fee increases. Uniform cost-based tuition fee increases achieve most of the welfare gains. The additional gains from fee di¤erentiation are relatively unimportant. The welfare gains are quite large if one makes conservative assumptions on the social cost of public funds, and there is a substantial redistribution from students to outsiders. Our empirical framework may be used to assess the e¤ects of additional policy reforms of public systems. For example, in several countries governments aim to rationalize the supply by reducing the number of institutions through associations and/or reducing the number of duplicated programs. In future research, it would be of strong interest to evaluate the e¢ ciency and distributional e¤ects of these and other, more drastic reforms, such as decentralizing decision-making to the universities and colleges.
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Pupils
The pupils data set contains information on all 55,905 pupils who attended the last year of secondary school in the year 2001. For each pupil there is information on …ve variables, de…ning the pupil's pro…le: secondary school institution, study program during last year of secondary school, postal code, age (birth year), sex and nationality.
Students
The students data set contains information on all students who …rst registered for a higher education program in either 2001 or in 2002. Information is available on each student's pro…le, according to the same …ve variables as in the pupils data set. In addition, the data set contains each student's choice of higher education institution, campus and study program. Finally, there is information on the year of graduation from secondary school. We use this last variable to extract the subset of students who graduated from a secondary school in the year 2001. This amounts to a total number of 35,562 …rst registering students, out of which the large majority (34,395 students) immediately registered after secondary school graduation in 2001, and a small group registered with one year of delay in 2002 (1,167 students). Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the fraction of 2001 pupils that …rst registers to a higher education institution after 2002 is negligible.
Our task is to distinguish between pupils who become students and pupils who remain "outsiders", i.e. who do not register at a higher education institution in 2001 or 2002. In principle, this can be done by combining the pupils and the students data sets, based on their pro…les as de…ned by the …ve common variables: a pupil for which there is a successful match with a student can be identi…ed as a student, while a pupil for which there is no successful match with a student can be identi…ed as an outsider. In practice, we also found a small number of students for which there is no successful match with a pupil. Based on correspondence with the ministry of education, we attribute this to some inconsistencies in the de…nition of the pupils'pro…les rather than in the de…nition of the students'pro…les. We therefore adopt the following approach when matching the pupils and students data sets. We identify as students all individuals in the students data set (even if no successful match with a pupil was found). We then identify as outsiders all pupils for which there is no successful match with a student. This will generate a data set with slightly too many individuals that are identi…ed as outsiders: this excess number is equal to the number of students for which no successful match with a pupil was found. We then randomly drop this excess number of individuals from the outsiders. Our combined data set then contains information on 55,905 pupils: 35,562 students and 20,343 outsiders.
In addition to the two main data sets, we constructed a number of auxiliary data sets. First, we have information on various characteristics of the secondary school institution and the study program during the last year of high school. The information on the secondary school institution includes the postal code of the secondary school and the network a¢ liation (free subsidized, o¢ cial subsidized, or community). The information on the study program during the last year of secondary school includes the main category (i.e. general, technical, arts or professional high school program), as well as more speci…c information (focus on languages, math, science, etc.). Second, we have information on the analogue characteristics of the higher education institution and study program. Third, we have information on the distribution of several demographic variables: average income by postal code, and average commuting distance and commuting time of the active labor force by postal code. Fourth, we make use of Microsoft's route planning software to compute the distance and car travel time between each individual's postal code address and each higher education institution's postal code address. The distance and travel time between an individual's postal code and the no-study alternative is set equal to the average distance travelled to work, by postal code. Finally, we use information provided by the Belgian railroad company to compute train travel times, i.e. train travel time between each individual's closest train station and each higher education institution's closest train station, plus car travel time to and from the respective stations. (Universiteitendecreet, 1991; Hogescholendecreet, 1994) . The bottom panel is based on the proposed new subsidy scheme (Vandenbroucke, 2005) . We report student-weighted averages of subsidies per study …eld for both colleges and universities. Reported as semi-elasticities: % change in market share given a cost increase of e 1,000. The changes are in e/pupil and relative to the status quo.
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